Project Title: DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE RISK ASSESMENT FRAMEWORK FOR GEOLOGICAL STORAGE OF CO2

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U.S. Department of Energy

National Energy Technology Laboratory
Carbon Storage R&D Project Review Meeting
Developing the Technologies and
Infrastructure for CCS
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Presentation Outline

- 1. Benefit to the Program
- 2. Goals and Objectives
- 3. Technical Status Project
- 4. Accomplishments to Date
- 5. Summary

Benefit to the Program

The research project is developing a comprehensive understanding of the programmatic (business), and technical risks associated with CCS particularly the likelihood of leakage and its potential consequences. This contributes to the Carbon Storage Program's effort of ensuring 99 percent CO₂ storage permanence in the injection zone(s) (Goal).

PROJECT GOALS and OBJECTIVES

- Employing Bayesian inference to evaluate sequestration risks
- Utilize the safety record of the CO2 based Enhanced Oil Recovery industry (CO2-EOR) and pilot sequestration projects to identify and evaluate potential risks
- Identify and quantify the nature of programmatic risks
- Utilize diverse, highly qualified expert panels drawn from industry and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to evaluate changing perceptions of programmatic risks
- Develop an understanding and quantify the role that a pressure field generated by injected CO2 (and the dissolution of CO2 from the plume into the brine phase) may play in risk
- Assess the possible consequences to water ecology and energy resources from potential leakage of CO2 from deep brine reservoirs.

Comprehensive Risk Study of CCS: Risks of Transporting CO₂ by Pipeline

Ian Duncan
University of Texas

Lets talk about individual risks that we face:

Why don't we all live in concrete bunkers?

What is the probability that something, like a jet engine, will fall from the air and kill us?

Is it safe?

"because nothing can be absolutely free of risk, nothing can be said to be absolutely safe"

Lowrance (1976)

"A thing is safe if its risks are judged to be acceptable."

Lowrance (1976)

"establishing acceptable levels of risk, particularly for those in proximity to a pipeline, will always be a difficult task."

Williams (2012)... Report to Parliament of Canada

Estimating Level of Acceptable Risk

Analysis of actuarial risk/benefit information could reveal the magnitude of risk acceptable to the public. Starr (1969)

the "revealed preference approach" ... Slovic (1987)

Why Study Risks Associated with CO₂ Pipelines?

IPCC (2005):

"If CO2 is transported for significant distances in densely populated regions; the number of people potentially exposed to risks from CO2 transportation facilities may be greater than the number exposed to potential risks from CO2 capture and storage facilities"

"Public concerns about CO2 transportation may form a significant barrier to large-scale use of CCS".

Why Study Risk of Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines

 Natural gas transmission pipelines follow same design codes, use same steel and installation techniques as CO₂ pipelines.

 Only data set on public risk large enough to make a robust analysis

What do the Newspapers Say about Risks of Natural Gas Pipelines?

USA Today, 2000


"pipelines are time bombs" and that "2 million miles of them deliver potential catastrophe everyday".

USA Today, 2011

"A fiery natural gas explosion in Allentown, Pa., is the latest in a series of deadly accidents that have raised worries about a form of energy that had a good safety record until recently".

Lets look at some Real Information


Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Incidents






But Pipelines are Getting Safer!

Pipeline Deaths and Injuries (1986-2010)





Fatality and Injury Rates Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines





Transmission Pipeline Explosion

San Bruno, California





The Scene after the San Bruno Event





Why are Natural Gas Pipeline Incident Rates of Interest?

Almost all previous risk studies of CO₂ Pipelines have Used Incident Rates for Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines as Estimates of Individual Risk...

Natural Gas Pipeline Incident Rates used by Published CO2 Pipeline Risk Analyses


 3.0×10^{-3} to 1.5×10^{-4} (per kilometer per year), median of about 2.0×10^{-4}

13 published CO2 pipeline risk analyses use these probability estimates

US rate for modern pipelines (last 30 years)

 1.2×10^{-5} per km per year


Injury + Fatality Rates versus Number of Significant Incidents






If Incident Rates do not Correlate with Fatalities... what are they Correlated with?

Serious Incident Rate versus Gas Price






Onshore Incident rate versus Gas Price






Offshore Natural Gas Pipeline Incident Rate Versus Gas Price






How can we use Natural Gas Pipeline Data to Understand Likelihood of failure of Future CO2 Pipelines?

Injury and Fatality Rate Versus NG Pipeline Age






Failure Mechanism versus NG Pipeline Age








Failure Pressure to MAOP versus Pipeline Age






Rupture Rate Versus NG Pipeline Age






Most Ruptures are Small



Public versus Company Injury/Fatality Rates





U.S. Approach

 Pipeline design and construction must meet ASME Design Standards

 Pipeline operators must do proactive risk management on pipelines in High Consequence Areas (HCAs)


High Consequence Areas

Class 1 Rural 10 or fewer houses within 150 meters

Class 2 Village or outer suburban area with more than 10 and less than 46 buildings intended for human occupancy within 150 meters.

Class 3 Town with 46 or more houses or any area within 100 meters of a building or a playground, recreation area, outdoor theatre, etc.

Class 4 Urban/city buildings with four or more stories





Public versus Non-Public Risks

Public fatality risk = 7.2×10^{-7}

Non-Public fatality risk = 4.8×10^{-7}


Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Failure near Elyria, Ohio, August, 2012

Consequence:

Four serious injuries to members of general public







What Happened?

The vehicle ... attempted to jump over railroad tracks at a high rate of speed

... went air born at least 40 feet

... went thru a chain link fence and crashed into a cinder block building

... Four people were in the car.

What is the Significance of High Consequence Area Regulations for Predicting CO2 Pipeline Safety?

No previous study has examined the effect that HCA rules have on pipeline risk...

"accidents [associated with CO₂ pipelines] in densely populated areas represent a greater risk both in terms of probability and severity." (Esteves and Morgado, 2012)

High Consequence Areas

Class 1 Rural 10 or fewer houses within 150 meters

Class 2 Village or outer suburban area with more than 10 and less than 46 buildings intended for human occupancy within 150 meters.

Class 3 Town with 46 or more houses or any area within 100 meters of a building or a playground, recreation area, outdoor theatre, etc.

Class 4 Urban/city buildings with four or more stories

Design Factors for HCAs

ASME B31.8S specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) as key design factors:

Class 1 72% of SMYS


Class 2 60% of SMYS

Class 3 50% of SMYS

Class 4 40% of SMYS


For constant pipeline pressure, the design factor is accommodated by increasing the wall thickness thus increasing the SMYS

Pipeline Wall Thickness Versus Diameter






Safety Factor versus Injury Rate





Safety Factor Versus Fatality Rate





Safety Factor vs. Rupture (>10 in) Rate





Public Fatality Rate





Safety Factor vs. Rupture (>10 in) Rate





Public Fatality Rate





But do Design Factors Effectively Manage Risk of Fatalities?

Lets Talk about the Nature of Risk

Voluntary Versus Imposed Risks

 Voluntary risks are taken on under informed consent.... (examples: mountain climbing, working for a pipeline emergency response team)

 Imposed risks (a pipeline gets built next to my house, a gas well is drilled near my water well)

EXAMPLES OF INDIVUAL RISKS:

North Sea offshore oil and gas production

1 in 1000 or **1 x 10⁻³ per year**. Equivalent to a rate of just above 30 fatal accidents per 10⁸ exposure hours.

Mountain climbing: risk of 10-3 per year

Driving an automobile: risk of **1 x 10**⁻⁴ per year

Flying: risk of 5 x 10⁻⁵ per year.

Exposure to 10⁻³ Risks

	Number of activities in one year that equals and IRPA of					
Activity	10 ⁻³ per year					
Hang-gliding	116 flights					
Surgical anaesthesia	185 operations					
Scuba diving	200 dives					
Rock climbing	320 climbs					

At what risk level do we loose interest?

- Risk of something falling from sky and killing us is 10⁻⁹
- Risk of death from the sky within 2 Km of an airport is 10⁻⁸
- But we don't live in concrete bunkers so most of us are not concerned about risks at this level...

FATALITY RATE VERSUS CLASS

Total Fatalities

Class $1 = 4.0 \times 10^{-6}$

Class $2 = 1.0 \times 10^{-6}$


Class 3&4 = zero

Public Fatalities

Class $1 = 1.0 \times 10^{-6}$


Class 2,3,&4 = zero

UK HSE Acceptable Risk






Cost Benefit Analysis



Cost of Lowering Risk






CONCLUSIONS: NG Pipeline Risk

 Real risk data from US pipelines suggest that the risk to the general public from natural gas transmission pipelines shows that risk of fatalities is two orders of magnitude smaller that set as acceptable in Europe.....

Acceptable Level of Risk Revealed?

UK HSE Acceptable Risk





CONCLUSIONS: CO₂ Pipeline Risk

 Likelihood of CO2 pipeline failure significant enough to cause deaths at least 3 orders of magnitude less than assumed in previous risk studies.

 Individual risk of CO₂ pipelines is likely in the range of 10⁻⁶ to 10⁻⁷ or lower

 Fatality risk of a well designed, appropriately mitigated CO2 pipeline in an urban area is even lower

Risk of US Pipelines versus other Countries?

In the US lack of strong land-use zoning enables urban development to encroach on pipelines.

Most major pipeline accidents with fatalities have occurred in unmonitored pipelines not up to code, and with critical defects.

Pipelines in most countries meet or exceed ASME design codes.

Final thought...

For pipelines, dams, for earthquake safety, for unconventional natural gas development etc.

..... how safe do we want it to be and are we prepared to pay the cost?

Appendix

Organization Chart

	Project Director Ian Duncan Phone: 512-471-5117 Cell: 512-923-8016 ian.duncan@beg.utexas.edu								
Task 1 Management	Task 2 Development and application of Conceptual Framework for Risk	Task 3 Development of protocols for risk assessment for geologic							
	Assessments for CO2 Sequestration Projects in Deep Brine Reservoirs	sequestration in brines							
Task Leader: Ian Duncan	Task Leader: Eric Bickel 512 232 8316 ebickel@mail.utexas.edu	Task Leader: Ian Duncan							

Gantt Chart

ID	Task Name			21	010	T	2011				2012		2013				2014	
		09 Q3	Q4			4 0			Q4			Q4	Q1			Q1	Q2 Q3	
. 1	1 Project Management, Planning, and Reporting																	
2	2 Development and Application of Conceptual Framework for Risk Assessments		_		10 10	-	-			-				-			_	
3	2.1 Compilation and critical review of existing site-specific risk assessments																	
4	2.2 Compilation of information on operational risks from CO2-EOR industry and identification of linkages between programmatic and technical risks									- 3								
5	2.3 Development of prototype risk analysis methodologies															1		
6	2.4 Implementation and testing of proposed risk analysis methodologies	1																
7	2.5 Refinement of risk analysis methodologies	l d								- 3								
8	2.6 Analysis of programmatic and operational risks for CO2 sequestration projects based on data from CO2-EOR projects			1 8			1											
9	Projection of risks for CO2 sequestration projects (based on data from commercial natural gas storage)																	
10	 2.8 Identification of realistic, fact based, scenarios for leakage from geologic reservoir containment 																	
11	2.9 Evaluation of the risk of leakage from geologic reservoir's containment based on an innovative new analysis using Bayesian inference based on flow simulations																	
12	2.10 Modeling of the risk of leakage from geologic reservoirs based on multiple flow simulations									-	-				i.			
13	2.11 Identification of risk associated with injection pressures and development of approaches to model flow under the influence of a pressure front					Ť												
14	2.12 Modeling risks associated with pressure driven brine flows	- 3																
15	2.13 Modeling risks associated with seal leakage	- 1		1 1						8	4							
16	2.14 Estimating risk associated with seal leakage through fault, and fracture zones	1								- 3								
17	 2.15 Identification of risk associated with injection pressure inducing earthquakes 																	
18	 2.16 Development of site-specific risk protocols for pressure induced earthquakes 	- 1																
19	2.17 Modeling and analysis of risks associated with injection pressure induced earthquakes.																	
20	2.18 Evaluate risk related to CO2 dissolution into brine and entering regional flow systems						ŝ											
21	2.19 Modeling the changes in leakage risk related to CO2 dissolution into brine	1			11		- 1	1 7						1	10		1	
22	2.20 Modeling the leakage risk related to CO2 dissolution in regional flow systems						- 1											

2.21 Compilation of Data Relevant to Evaluating Consequences of Possible Leakage from

Deep Brine Reservoirs

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